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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                         
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4569 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 ALEXI LOPEZ-LAROSA, 
    Appellant 
 
 _____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of  New Jersey                                                            
District Court No. 2-13-cr-00292-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh                            
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 26, 2014)        
                       
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
 
 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge  
  
 Alexi Lopez-LaRosa pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to receive 
and sell stolen goods—specifically, wine and vitamins—in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 and one count of receiving and selling stolen wine in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2315 and § 2.  Lopez-LaRosa appeals his sentence.1  Counsel also moves to 
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 Lopez-LaRosa pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement containing a 
broad appellate waiver.  Specifically, Lopez-LaRosa gave up his right to 
“challenge[] the sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls 
within or below the [Sentencing] Guidelines range that results from the agreed 
total Guidelines offense level of 19.”  Although Lopez-LaRosa reserved his right 
“to appeal the sentencing court’s determination of the criminal history category,” 
he waived his right to appeal the District Court’s acceptance of “a stipulation” 
from the parties.  At sentencing, the parties stipulated to a criminal history 
category of IV.  An offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of IV 
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corresponds with a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ incarceration. 
 The District Court sentenced Lopez-LaRosa to 28 months’ imprisonment on 
both counts to run concurrently.  In reaching this sentence, the District Court 
accepted the parties’ stipulation as to Lopez-LaRosa’s criminal history category.  
But the District Court also granted Lopez-LaRosa a five-level downward departure 
as to his offense level pursuant to the Government’s U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion on 
account of Lopez-LaRosa’s cooperation.  In doing so, the District Court expressly 
considered, inter alia, “any potential injury or danger or risk to [Lopez-LaRosa] 
and his family.”   
 After sentencing, Lopez-LaRosa filed a notice of appeal arguing that the 
District Court had insufficiently considered both his “extremely helpful and 
valuable” cooperation as well as the danger to himself and his family because of 
that cooperation.  Lopez-LaRosa also disputed the District Court’s reliance on his 
criminal history in meting out his sentence.  Upon receipt of counsel’s Anders 
motion, Lopez-LaRosa submitted a pro se brief raising as an additional issue the 
District Court’s failure to consider his decision not to flee upon learning that law 
enforcement sought his arrest. 
II. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise appellate 
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 “The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief are (1) to satisfy the 
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable 
issues, and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.”  United States v. Youla, 
241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 
780 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Although “[c]ounsel need not raise and reject every possible 
claim,” id., counsel must provide “sufficient indicia that he thoroughly searched 
the record and the law in service of his client so that we might confidently consider 
only those objections raised,” Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781.   
 Counsel focuses his Anders brief on the District Court’s express 
consideration of Lopez-LaRosa’s cooperation in granting a five-level departure, 
making an appeal on grounds that the District Court failed to consider that 
cooperation frivolous.  And counsel notes that the District Court considered 
Lopez-LaRosa’s higher criminal history category and his more substantive role in 
relation to his co-conspirators in declining to give greater consideration to 
potential sentencing disparities. 
 But counsel does not adequately address Lopez-LaRosa’s concern, raised 
before counsel submitted his Anders brief, that the District Court improperly relied 
on his criminal history.  In limiting the discussion of criminal history to potential 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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sentencing disparities, counsel overlooks the potential appealable issue that the 
District Court erred in calculating Lopez-LaRosa’s criminal history category.  This 
omission is particularly troubling given that Lopez-LaRosa’s appellate waiver 
reserved his right “to appeal the sentencing court’s determination of the criminal 
history category” absent a stipulation.  Accordingly, counsel has not met his duty 
to “mention all the issues raised by his client and assure us that he has considered 
them and found them patently without merit.”  Id. 
III. 
 Despite the inadequacy of counsel’s Anders brief, the Court will grant the 
motion and affirm Lopez-LaRosa’s sentence without appointing new counsel.  
“‘[I]n those cases in which frivolousness is patent,’ we will not appoint new 
counsel even if an Anders brief is insufficient to discharge current counsel’s 
obligations to his or her client and this court.”  United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 
316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781).  Here, Lopez-LaRosa 
agreed to a broad waiver of his right to appeal.  Lopez-LaRosa confirmed his 
understanding of the appellate waiver at his plea colloquy and nothing in the 
record suggests that the waiver was ineffective.  See United States v. Khattak, 273 
F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Waivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily, are valid, unless they work a miscarriage of justice.”).  As noted 
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above, that waiver barred any sentencing appeal if the District Court sentenced 
Lopez-LaRosa to less than “the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total 
Guidelines offense level of 19.”  Applying a criminal history category of IV, 
Lopez-LaRosa’s 28-month sentence is far below the resulting 46 to 57 month 
range.   
 Further, although the appellate waiver left open the possibility of a 
challenge to the District Court’s determination of Lopez-LaRosa’s criminal history 
category, that waiver also provided that Lopez-LaRosa could not appeal the 
District Court’s acceptance of a stipulation between the parties.  The District 
Court’s calculation of a criminal history category of IV was based upon the 
parties’ stipulation to that effect.  And even were Lopez-LaRosa successful in 
reducing his criminal history category to I, the plea agreement’s total offense level 
of 19 would still yield a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months.  This too is higher 
than Lopez-LaRosa’s 28-month sentence.  Accordingly, Lopez-LaRosa’s appellate 
waiver applies in full force and his appeal is frivolous. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw 
and affirm the judgment of the District Court.  We will also certify that the issue 
presented in the appeal lacks legal merit and does not require counsel to file a 
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petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 
